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ERS MILITARY DIV. OF THE MISSOURI.
Chicago, Illinois, November 1, 1869.

SHERMAN,
Chief, Army of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit for your information, the following report of military operations in the Department of Missouri, from October 15, 1868, to March 27, 1869. In my annual report of last year, and in a special report made previously, I gave details of the murderous outbreak and massacre of defenceless frontier citizens by that class of our people known as Indians. These reports also covered the operations of the troops up to the 15th of October, embracing many combats, in which the number of Indians killed was ninety-two, number of wounded unknown; the number of soldiers killed—six, and wounded—ten; number of citizens—men, women and children murdered by the Indians—seventy-nine, and nine wounded.

The Indians, commencing about the 10th of August, had distributed themselves in small parties along the western line of the settlements in Kansas, and the eastern line of settlements in Colorado, and the lines of travel up the Smoky Hill river to Denver, and on the Arkansas river and Santa Fe roads—driving in the settlers, stopping all commercial traffic, murdering many defenceless persons in the most brutal manner, and escaping from the troops sent against them, by traveling at night, or by the swiftness of their hardy grass-fed ponies. This kind of work they expected to keep up until the approach of winter, when the inclemency of the weather would give them ample security, and they could live on their plunder, glory in the scalps taken, and the debasement of the poor unfortunate women whom they held as prisoners.

The experience of many years of this character of Indian depredations, with security to themselves and families in the winter, had made them very confident and bold; especially was this true of the previous summer and winter; so boldly had this system of murder and robbery been carried on, that not less than eight hundred people had been murdered since June, 1862—men, women and children. To disabuse the minds of the savages of this confident security, and to strike them at a period at which they were the most, if not en-

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TS AND CASUALTIES DURING THE WAR OF 1868 A

DATE.	PLACE OF ENGAGEMENT.	COMMANDING OFFICER.
1868.		
August 27th to 29th, - -	Hatchet Mountains.....	Captain Alexander Moore.....
September 2d, - - -	Little Coon Creek, Kansas.....	Corporal Goodwin.....
September 10th, - - -	Boggs' Ranch.....	General William H. Pennington.....
September 11th to 15th,	Skirmishes south of Arkansas River.....	General Alfred Sully.....
September 15th, - - -	Big Sandy Creek.....	Captain G. W. Graham.....
September 17th, - - -	Arickaree, Fork of Republican	Colonel George A. Forsyth.....
October 18th, - - -	Beaver Creek.....	Bvt. Lieut. Col. L. H. Carr.....
October 19th, to } November 2d, }	Skirmishes during movements of expedition in the State of Kansas.....	General E. A. Carr.....
November 27th, - - -	Washita, (near Antelope Hills.).....	General G. A. Custer.....
December 25th, - - -	Junction of Salt Fork and Elm Creek, Texas.	Colonel A. W. Evans.....
1869.		
January 29th, - - -	Malberry Creek, Kansas.....	Captain Edward Byrne.....
1868 and 1869, - - -	New Mexico.....	Scouting parties.....

AND '69, AGAINST HOSTILE INDIANS, IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI.

OFFICER.	Strength.	INDIAN TRIBES.	Number of Indians Engaged.	Commissioned Officers.			Enlisted Men.			Scouts.			Indians.			
				Killed.	Wounded.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Captured.	Total.
		Utes and Apaches.....											3		3	6
	6		50				3	3					3	1		4
080	35		20				2	1	3				4			4
	500	Cheyennes, Arapahoes and Kiowas...	800				3	7	10				22	12		34
	36		100				1	1					11	14		25
h.....	52	Northern Cheyennes, Brule, Ogallala tribes of Sioux, and Dog Soldiers...	900	2	1	3				5	14	19	32	96		128
per, 120		Cheyennes, Arapahoes and Sioux.....	500				3	3					10	15		25
	458	Cheyennes, Arapahoes and Sioux.....											20			20
	798	Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Sioux, Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches.....	900	2	3	5	19	11	30				153	75	53	281
	446	Comanches and Kiowas.....	300				3	3					25	35		60
	25	Pawnees.....	30				2	2					7	1		8
		Mescalero Apaches.....					2	2	4				3	5		8

tirely helpless, became a necessity, and the General-in-Chief, then in command of this Division, authorized a winter campaign, and at or about the same time directed that the reservation set apart for the Kiowas and Comanches at the Witehita Mountains should be considered a place of refuge—where, if the savages would go and submit, they would be exempt from the operations of the troops. The authority for this winter campaign was received October 9, 1868. At this time the operations of the Indians had been mostly transferred to the line of the Arkansas river and Santa Fe road; owing to the operations of troops under Colonel FORSYTH, General BRADLEY and General CARR; north of the Smoky Hill river and on the Republican, as well as to the near approach of winter, which caused the savages to work in the direction of their families, then supposed to be on the headwaters of the Red river, immediately south of the Antelope Hills.

To make this campaign, I directed General GETTY to quickly organize a small column at Fort Bascom, New Mexico, General EUGENE CARR to organize a column on the Arkansas river, while a third column, composed of eleven companies of the 7th Cavalry, twelve companies 19th Kansas Cavalry, and three companies of the 3d and one company of the 38th Infantry was directed to concentrate at or near the junction of Beaver creek with the North Canadian—one hundred and twelve miles south of Fort Dodge. The most determined efforts had to be made to prepare troops at these remote points before the extreme cold weather set in, and besides, the 19th Kansas had to be raised, mustered in, horses bought, men equipped and made ready for work in an uninhabited and almost unknown country. Thanks to the energies of the officers engaged in these duties I was enabled to promptly put these columns in motion.

I had, during this period, transported with great labor, four hundred thousand rations to Dodge, three hundred thousand rations to Lyon, and directed three hundred thousand to be sent from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Arbuckle, *via* Fort Gibson—a distance of about five hundred miles.

To General GETTY, who was commanding the District of New Mexico, was entrusted the organization and supply of the column from Bascom. On November 5th, the 19th Kansas was in readiness and moved from Topeka, *via* the mouth of the Little Arkansas to Camp Supply—the point before alluded to at the junction of the North Canadian and Beaver creek; and on the 11th of November

the 7th Cavalry and 3d Infantry moved from Dodge for the same destination. The column from Bascom had already moved, and CARR's column from Lyon was ordered to move November 12th. On November 15th I started for Camp Supply, to give a general supervision and to participate in the operations. I deemed it best to go in person, as the campaign was an experimental one—campaigns at such a season having been deemed impracticable and reckless by old and experienced frontiersmen, and I did not like to expose the troops to great hazard without being present myself to judge of their hardships and privations.

The objects of the winter's operations were to strike the Indians a hard blow, and force them on to the reservations set apart for them, and if this could not be accomplished to show to the Indian that the winter season would not give him rest, and that he and his villages and stock could be destroyed; that he would have no security, winter or summer, except in obeying the laws of peace and humanity.

The plan of operations to accomplish these purposes was, to let the small column from Bascom, consisting of six companies of the 3d Cavalry, two companies of the 37th Infantry, and four mountain howitzers, aggregating five hundred and sixty-three men, operate along the main Canadian—establishing a depot at Monument creek, and remaining out as long as it could be supplied—at least until some time in January; the column of General CARR to unite with a small force under General PENROSE—then on, composed of one company of the 7th and four small companies of the 10th Cavalry—establishing a depot on the headwaters of the North Canadian, and operate south, towards the Antelope Hills and headwaters of Red river. These columns were really beaters in, and were not expected to accomplish much. The main column, from Camp Supply, was expected to strike the Indians either on the headwaters of the Washita or still further south on the Sweetwater and other branches of the Red river.

I arrived at Camp Supply on the evening of November 21st, and found the command under General SULLY engaged in the construction of a block house, wells and storehouse for the protection of our supplies. A furious snow storm commenced on the same evening, which continued during the night and next day, making the situation very gloomy, especially on account of the non-arrival of the 19th Kansas, which I had expected would have reached Camp Supply about the same time as myself. This was a great disappoint-

ment to me, as I had expected to unite this regiment with the 7th Cavalry, and launch them both on the Indians, whom I still supposed to be just south of the Antelope Hills. This disappointment was further increased by the appearance of Indians on the distant hills as I came down just north of Bluff creek, and the discovery of a large fresh trail by SULLY's command—traveling due north; and I thought the discovery of the troops would cause the Indians south of the Antelope Hills to take flight. I therefore, on the second day after my arrival at Camp Supply, directed General CUSTER to move his regiment—storm or no storm, on the morning of November 23d. This order was responded to with alacrity by the officers and men of the 7th Cavalry, and on the morning of the 23d the regiment moved at daylight, although the snow continued to fall with unabated fury.

On the evening of the 26th, General CUSTER struck the trail of the war party before alluded to as having passed north, and which had been seen by SULLY's command, and some of the same party had been seen by my escort, near Bluff creek. This war party was composed, as I afterwards learned from Indians, of Black Kettle's band of Cheyennes; also, other Cheyennes and Arapahoes. They had been north, killed the mail carriers between Dodge and Larned, an old hunter at Dodge, and two of my expressmen whom I had sent back with letters from Bluff creek to Dodge. As soon as CUSTER struck the trail he corraled his wagons, left a small escort with them, and followed the Indian trail, which was very fresh and well marked in the deep snow, until it led into Black Kettle's village. The next morning, before daylight, the Osage Indian trailers discovered the village and stock of the Indians, and notified CUSTER, who at once made the most admirable disposition of his command for the attack and capture of the village. At dawn the attack was made, the village captured and burned, eight hundred horses or ponies killed in accordance with my positive orders, and one hundred and three warriors killed, and fifty-three women and children captured.

Whilst this work was going on, all the Indians for a distance of fifteen miles down the Washita collected and attacked CUSTER; these Indians were Cheyennes, Comanches, Kiowas and Apaches, but were driven down the stream for a distance of four or five miles, when as night was approaching, CUSTER withdrew and returned to a small train of provisions which he had directed to follow up his movements. Our loss at the attack on the village was Captain

LOUIS M. HAMILTON and three men killed, and three officers and eleven men wounded; but, unfortunately, Major ELLIOTT, of the regiment, a very gallant and promising young officer, seeing some of the young boys escape, followed, with the Sergeant Major and fifteen men to capture and bring them in; ~~but~~, after capturing them and while on their way back to the regiment, they were surrounded and killed. It occurred, I think, in this way:—ELLIOTT and his party followed the boys shortly after the attack on the village, taking a course due south, and nearly at right angles to the Washita river, which was here very small; after travelling south one mile and a half from the village, a very small branch of the Washita was crossed, and an open prairie reached; on this prairie the boys were captured and were being brought back when the party was attacked by Indians from below, numbering from one thousand to fifteen hundred; it fought its way back towards the small creek before named until within rifle range of the creek, when it was stopped by the Indians having taken position in the bed of the creek, and picking off the men, who had formed a little circle, around which their dead and horribly mutilated bodies were found. No one, so far as I could learn, of those back with the regiment, knew of their having followed the Indian boys—no one heard the report of their guns, and no one knew of their exact fate until they were discovered some two weeks afterwards.

General CUSTER, after destroying the village, and driving the Indians some four or five miles down the Washita returned, as heretofore mentioned, to the train of supplies which he had directed to follow him, and next day started back to Camp Supply with his prisoners, where he arrived on the 1st of December.

While CUSTER was thus operating, I was in a very disturbed state of mind about the 19th Kansas, from which I still had no tidings; that it had lost the trail in the snow, or turned back had become evident, from the long delay in its arrival at Camp Supply. On November 25th, I was relieved from this great anxiety by the arrival of Captain PILEY and about thirty men. The regiment had lost its way, and becoming tangled up in the canons of the Cimarron and in the deep snow, and out of provisions, it could not make its way out, and was in a bad fix. Provisions were immediately sent, and good guides to bring it in. It had been subsisting on buffalo for eight or nine days, and as the buffalo were plentiful no very great suffering was occasioned for want of food.

November 30th, Colonel CRAWFORD commanding the regiment, came into Camp Supply with four companies, and in a few days after the remainder of the regiment arrived. Officers and men behaved admirably in the trying condition in which they were placed, but the poor horses suffered greatly, and a number of them were lost; in fact, the regiment was very much disabled for effective work at this season of the year.

The blow that CUSTER had struck was a hard one, and fell on the guiltiest of all the bands—that of Black Kettle. It was this band that, without provocation, had massacred the settlers on the Saline and Solomon, and perpetrated cruelties too fiendish for recital. Black Kettle, its nominal chief—a worn out and worthless old cypher, was said to be friendly, but when I sent him word to come in to Dodge before any of the troops had commenced operations—saying that I would feed and protect himself and family, he refused, and was killed in the fight. He was also with the band on Walnut creek, where they made their medicine, or held their devilish incantations previous to the party setting out to massacre the settlers. I subjoin here the affidavit of EDMUND GUERRIERE, an educated half-breed and an intelligent man, who was with the tribe at the time, showing that the men of this very band were the leaders of the massacre, and instigators of the war.

“ HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

IN THE FIELD, MEDICINE BLUFF CREEK

Wichita Mountains, February 24th, 1869.

Personally appeared before me, EDMUND GUERRIERE, who resides on the Purgatoire river, Colorado Territory, who being duly sworn, testifies as follows:

I was with the Cheyenne Indians at the time of the massacre on the Solomon and Saline rivers, in Kansas, the early part or middle of last August, and I was living at this time with Little Rock's band.

The war party who started for the Solomon and Saline was Little Rock's, Black Kettle's, Medicine Arrow's and Bull Bear's bands; and as near as I can remember, nearly all the different bands of Cheyennes had some of their young men in this war party which committed the outrages and murders on the Solomon and Saline. Red Nose, and The-man-who-breaks-the-marrow-bones, (Ho-ch-a-mo-a-hoe) were the two leaders in this massacre; the former belonged to the Dog Soldiers, and the latter to Black Kettle's band. As soon as we heard the news by runners who came on ahead to Black Kettle—saying that they had already commenced fighting, we moved from our camp on Buckner's Fork of the Pawnee, near its headwaters, down to North Fork, where we met Big Jakes' band,

and then moved south, across the Arkansas river; and when we got to the Cimarron, GEORGE BENT and I left them, and went to our homes on the Purgatoire.

(Signed,)

EDMUND GUERRIERE.

WITNESS :

(Signed,)

J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,

Bvt. Lieut. Col. U. S. A., Aide-de-Camp."

There was no provocation on the part of the whites or of the Government, to justify the Indians in commencing hostilities, except an allegation that the Agent would not deliver guns and ammunition to the tribe; and it is time that the Indians should know that any act of the Government or people will not justify murder, rape and pillage.

But, although Black Kettle's band were the leaders, all the other tribes participated more or less, until there was not a tribe south of the Platte, which did not have representatives in the war, as well as large numbers of the Sionx who came down from the Upper Missouri.

We found in Black Kettle's village photographs and daguerreotypes, clothing and bedding, from the houses of the persons massacred on the Solomon and Saline; the mail which I had sent by the expressmen, NAT MARSHALL and BILL DAVIS, from Bluff Creek to Fort Dodge, who were murdered and mutilated, was likewise found; also, a large blank book with Indian illustrations of the different fights which Black Kettle's band had been engaged in, especially about Fort Wallace and on the line of the Denver stages—showing when the fight had been with the colored troops—when with white; also, when trains had been captured and women killed in wagons. Still a hue and cry was raised, through the influence of the Indian ring, in which some good and pious ecclesiastics took part, and became the aid^{ers} and abettors of savages who murdered, without mercy, men, women and children; in all cases ravishing the women sometimes as often as forty and fifty times in succession, and while insensible from brutality and exhaustion, forced sticks up their persons; and, in one instance, the fortieth or fiftieth savage drew his sabre and used it on the person of the woman in the same manner. I do not know exactly how far these humanitarians should be excused on account of their ignorance, but surely it is the only excuse that gives a shadow of justification for aiding and abetting such horrid crimes.

Although CUSTER had struck a hard blow, and wiped out old Black Kettle and his murderers and rapers of helpless women, I did not feel that our work was done yet, but desired that the Indians should see fully how helpless they were even at this season, when the Government was in earnest. So on the 7th of December, after getting the Kansas regiment as well set up as possible, we moved towards the headwaters of the Washita, with thirty days rations for the men and about one-quarter rations of forage for the animals.

The snow was still on the ground and the weather very cold, but the officers and men were cheerful, although the men had only shelter tents. We moved due south until we struck the Washita, near CUSTER's fight of November 27th, having crossed the main Canadian with the thermometer about eighteen degrees below zero.

After reaching the Washita, my intention was to take up the trail of the Indians and follow it. We rested one day and made an examination of the ground; found the bodies of Major ELLIOTT and his small party, and examined the Indian camps or villages which had been abandoned when General CUSTER struck Black Kettle's band. They extended about twelve or thirteen miles down the river, and from the appearance of things they had fled in the greatest haste, abandoning provisions, robes, cooking utensils and every species of property; and it appeared to me they must have at last begun to realize that winter was not going to give them security.

On the next day we started down the Washita, following the Indian trail, but finding so many deep ravines and canons I thought we would move out on the divide, but a blinding snow storm coming on, and fearing to get lost with a large command and trains of wagons, on a treeless prairie without water, we were forced back to the banks of the Washita, where we at least could get wood and water. Next day we continued down the river, following the trail of the Indians, and crossed numerous ravines by digging and bridging with pioneer parties. This was continued until the evening of the 16th, when we came to the vicinity of the Indians—principally Kiowas. They did not dream that any soldiers could operate in such cold and inclement weather, and we marched down on them before they knew of our presence in the country; after night they saw our fires, and by means of relays communicated with General HAZEN, and obtained a letter from him, saying, that the Kiowas were friendly. This was a pretty good joke, as I had just followed their trail from CUSTER's battle field, and a por-

tion of this band had just come from Texas, where they had murdered and plundered in the most barbarous manner; while in the previous spring, their outrages on the Texas border are too horrible to relate, one item of which is that, in returning to their villages, fourteen of the poor little captive children were frozen to death. Then, immediately after my interview with them at Larned, on September 19th, a war party started over in the direction of the Santa Fe road, and burned a train of sixteen wagons—throwing the murdered teamsters into the flames. Still, I did not strike these Indians, on account of General HAZEN's letter, and because I did not at that time know the extent of their guilt. As soon as they found I was not going to attack them, the old system of lying and deception was revived, by their proposing that all the warriors should join my column, and march with it to Fort Cobb, while their villages moved to the same point, on the opposite bank of the Washita; but this was a decoy, as towards night all the warriors slipped off, as they said, to help the women along with the villages, leaving only about twenty chiefs and principal men, and early next morning these escaped, except Santanta and Lone Wolf, the head chiefs, whom I ordered CUSTER to arrest, and on reaching Fort Cobb that evening, I found that the villages, instead of moving to Fort Cobb, as they proposed, were going down towards the main Red river, west of the Wichita mountains in an opposite direction as fast as possible, and that some of them were nearly one hundred miles distant; and that the proposition of Lone Wolf and Santanta was a decoy to get their villages out of the way. I immediately issued orders for the execution of Lone Wolf and Santanta unless the villages came back in two days, and delivered themselves up at Fort Cobb. They all came back eventually under this pressure, and at a gait as fast as that of their flight, and Santanta and Lone Wolf were saved. I shall always regret, however, that I did not hang these Indians; they had deserved it many times; and I shall also regret that I did not punish the whole tribe when I first met them. The graves along the Santa Fe road, and along the northern border of Texas, of murdered men and women, would give evidence of the justice of such a course; but where there are so many authorities, a person sometimes gets confounded, as to what is his duty. At Fort Cobb, I found most of the Comanches and Apaches, they had hastened in to the reservation after the fight with General CUSTER. While these operations were going on, Lieutenant Colonel A. W.

EVANS moved as heretofore mentioned, from Bascom up the main Canadian, to Monument creek, there established his depot, and with the most commendable energy, struck off to the south, on to the headwaters of Red river, and discovered a trail of hostile Comanches who had refused to come in, followed it up with perseverance, and on the 25th of December attacked the party, killed as nearly as could be ascertained, twenty-five; wounded a large number, and captured and burnt their village, and destroyed a large amount of property, and then moved in to a point about twelve miles west of Fort Cobb, where I communicated with him.

Meanwhile, General CARR was scouting along the main Canadian, west of the Antelope Hills, and the country was becoming so unhealthy for Indians, that the Arapahoes and the remainder of the Cheyennes concluded to surrender, and go on to the reservation designated for them. The operations of the troops had forced these bands over into the eastern edge of the Staked Plains, where there was no game, and the limited amount of supplies which they had been able to put up for the winter, had been mostly lost in the engagement on the Washita, and in their subsequent flight.

The surrender was made by Little Robe for the Cheyennes, with other representative chiefs, and by Yellow Bear for the Arapahoes; they agreed to deliver their people up at Fort Cobb as speedily as possible—claiming that it would take some time to get in—on account of the exhausted condition of their stock.

The Arapahoes were faithful to their promise, and delivered themselves up under their head chief—Little Raven. The Cheyennes broke their promise and did not come in, so I ordered General CRSTER to move against them; this he did, and came on the Cheyennes on the headwaters of Red river—apparently moving ^{twenty} ~~seventy~~; it is possible they were on their way to Camp Supply, as in some of the conversations I had with Little Robe, I had declared that if they did not get into the Fort Cobb reservation within a certain time, they would not be received there, but would be received at Camp Supply; this was because I expected to stay only for a limited time at Fort Cobb, intending to return to Camp Supply.

CRSTER found them in a very forlorn condition, and could have destroyed, I think, most of the tribe—certainly their villages, but contented himself with taking their renewed promise to come into Camp Supply, and obtained from them two white women whom

they held as captives. The most of the tribe fulfilled this latter promise so far as coming into the vicinity of Camp Supply, and communicating with the Commanding Officer, but Tall Bull's band again violated the promise made, and went north to the Republican, where he joined a party of Sionx, who, on the 13th of May, '69, were attacked and defeated with heavy loss, whereupon, the whole tribe moved into Camp Supply.

Meantime, while the Arapahoes and Cheyennes were negotiating with me to surrender, the Quahrada or Staked Plains Comanches sent a delegation over to Bascom—offering to surrender themselves, under the expectation, perhaps, that they could get better terms there than with me, but General GETTY arrested the delegation, which was ordered to Fort Leavenworth, and finally returned to their people, on condition that they would deliver themselves up on the reservation at Medicine Bluff or Fort Sill; this was complied with, and I am now able to report that there has been a fulfillment of all the conditions which we had in view when we commenced our winter's campaign last November, namely:—punishment was inflicted; property destroyed; the Indians disabused of the idea that winter would bring security; and all the tribes south of the Platte forced on to the reservations set apart for them by the Government, where they are in a tangible shape for the good work of civilization, education, and religious instruction.

I cannot speak too highly of the patient and cheerful conduct of the troops under my command; they were many times pinched by hunger, and numbed by cold; sometimes living in holes below the surface of the prairie—dug to keep them from freezing; at other times pursuing the savages, and living on the flesh of mules. In all these trying conditions, the troops were always cheerful and willing, and the officers full of esprit. I cannot name the many who are deserving of special mention, but will express my thanks to all, through their gallant commanders,—Brevet Major General CUSTER, of the 7th Cavalry; Brevet Major General EUGENE A. CARR, 5th Cavalry; Colonel CRAWFORD, 19th Kansas Cavalry; and Colonel EVANS, 3d Cavalry, whose detailed reports I herewith respectfully submit; together with a tabular report of engagements between the troops and the Indians in this Department, during the campaign of 1868 and 1869; also, a tabular statement of murders and depredations committed by Indians in the Department of Missouri

and Northern Texas, in 1868 and '69.

I am Sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,

Lieutenant General.